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ABSTRACT
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo make three important contributions to the literature on
separation of powers in their new book. First, they seek to rescue the unitary executive theory from
the Bush administration lawyers, who have discredited the theory in the eyes of many by relying on
it to support outlandish claims of presidential power that are unrelated to the unitary executive
theory. Second, they make a persuasive case for the unitary executive theory by explaining why a
President must have the power to remove executive branch officers and to control policy making in
the executive branch. Third, they document the ways in which all forty-three of our Presidents
have demonstrated their beliefs in the theory by consistently acting in accordance with the theory.
In this review, I agree with most of the arguments that Calabresi and Yoo make, but I disagree
with them on two points. First, I do not believe that the President has the power to “veto” the
decision of an executive branch officer. I believe that his only recourse is to remove an officer with
whom he disagrees. Second, I do not believe that the for-cause limits on the President’s removal
powers that the Supreme Court has upheld interfere with the President’s ability to control policy
making in the executive branch.
I also make two other points. First, political limits on the removal power often are formidable and
are socially beneficial as a means of rendering the President accountable to the electorate. Second,
to the extent that the President’s ability to control policy making by “independent agencies” is
unduly impaired, the root of that problem lies in unconstitutional statutory limits on the
President’s appointment power rather than in the innocuous statutory limits on his removal power.

Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have made important contributions to our understanding of allocation of powers among the
1
branches of government in their book, The Unitary Executive. One of
those contributions lies in their effort to rescue the unitary executive
theory from those whose recent attempts to distort and to abuse it
have produced an environment of extreme hostility toward anything
that is tied to the theory. During the Administration of President
George W. Bush, many scholars, politicians, and members of the
general public came to think of the unitary executive theory, as illustrated by the far-fetched claims of people like John Yoo, Jay Bybee,
∗
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David Addington, and Alberto Gonzales, that the President is omnipotent in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. As Jack Goldsmith
has chronicled, President Bush’s lawyers claimed that the President
could do anything he wanted to do in the context of the war against
terror, including authorizing the torture of prisoners, and that his
discretion was not limited by statutes and was not reviewable by
2
courts.
The lawyers for the Bush administration often referred to their
claims as supported by the unitary executive theory, but their claims
are totally unrelated to the real unitary executive theory. This misleading use of the term has caused many scholars, politicians, and
members of the public to develop understandable hostility toward
any idea based on anything associated with something called the unitary executive theory. The Calabresi and Yoo book has the potential
to restore respect for the unitary executive theory by disassociating it
completely from the claims of presidential omnipotence that were
made by the Bush administration.
As Calabresi and Yoo explain, the unitary executive theory has a
rich history that spans several centuries. It has been embraced by
many scholars with widely varying political philosophies. It is not
nearly as ambitious in its scope and effects as the spurious version of
the theory that a few government lawyers have attempted to sell in recent years. The real unitary executive theory does not imply that the
President has powers greater than the powers of Congress or the Judiciary. It refers to the belief of many scholars that the Vesting
Clause of Article II confers on the President plenary power over policy making by all executive branch agencies and officials.
Calabresi and Yoo seek to fill a void in the scholarly literature on
the unitary executive theory. Many scholars have discussed the theory with reference to the text and history of the Constitution and to
the famous cases in which the Court has resolved disputes relevant to
the theory, but no one has attempted the daunting task of documenting the ways in which each President has actually implemented the
theory. Calabresi and Yoo describe their response to that gap in the
literature:
This book fills the void in the literature on executive branch practice
by undertaking a comprehensive historical chronicle of the struggles between the president and Congress over control of the execution of fed-

2

JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 144, 148–49 (2007) (noting that the Office of Legal Counsel had implied that many federal laws that limit interrogation violated the President’s commanderin-chief powers and were therefore unconstitutional and not binding).

Feb. 2010]

SAVING THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY

595

eral law, beginning with the presidency of George Washington in 1789
and concluding with the presidency of George W. Bush through mid2007. Our historical survey seeks to trace the development over time of
all three mechanisms essential to the classic theory of the unitary executive. These include the president’s power of removal, the president’s
power to direct subordinate executive officials, and the president’s power
to nullify or veto subordinate executive officials’ exercise of discretionary
3
executive power.

Calabresi and Yoo claim that their research shows that all forty-three
presidents believed in the theory of the unitary executive as they describe it; that each acted in accordance with the theory; and that each
prevailed on every occasion on which he was forced to defend the
4
theory against assaults from the legislative branch. They also contend that their research shows that “the executive branch’s consistent
opposition to congressional incursions on the unitary executive has
been sufficiently consistent and sustained to refute any suggestion of
presidential acquiescence in derogations from the unitary execu5
tive.”
With a few important qualifications that I will discuss later, Calabresi and Yoo effectively support all of their claims. Before I discuss
the evidence Calabresi and Yoo amass to support the claims made in
their book, however, it is important to note the scope of their undertaking and the important issues they choose not to address. They explicitly exclude from the scope of their project claims that the President has inherent powers to act in the absence of statutory
authorization or contrary to a statutory prohibition. They state their
belief that the President has some extremely limited inherent powers,
but they express great skepticism about the claims of some other
scholars that the President has broad inherent powers. Their skepticism borders on outright hostility when it comes to many of the
claims of inherent power made by lawyers for the Bush administration:
[T]he cost of the bad legal advice that [President Bush] received is that
Bush has discredited the theory of the unitary executive by associating it
not with presidential authority to remove and direct subordinate executive officials but with implied foreign policy powers, some of which, at
6
least, the president simply does not possess.

Calabresi and Yoo also choose not to discuss other controversial interpretations of Article II, including the many disputes with respect to
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CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 14.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 429.
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7

the Appointments Clause and the apparent belief of four Justices
that the Take Care Clause precludes Congress from conferring on
anyone except a member of the executive branch standing to obtain
8
judicial review of any decision that implements a public law.
As I have explained in detail elsewhere, I agree with most of the
views that Calabresi and Yoo express with respect to the unitary executive theory, including the view that the President has the power to
remove any executive branch officer and the power to direct any executive branch officer to act in accordance with the policies preferred
by the President as long as those policies are within constitutional
9
and statutory boundaries. I am delighted that their painstaking research has revealed that every President has shared those views and
acted in accordance with those views.
I. THE PRESIDENT CANNOT VETO A DECISION MADE BY AN EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFFICER
I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo on a few points, however. In
their version of the unitary executive theory, the President has the
power to “nullify or veto subordinate executive officials’ exercise of
10
executive power.” I do not believe that the President has such a
power. I believe instead that, when Congress has lawfully vested decision-making power in an executive branch officer, e.g., the Secretary
of Health and Human Services or the Environmental Protection
Agency Administrator, that executive branch officer is the only person who can make the decision. In that situation, the only recourse
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See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (illustrating a D.C. circuit panel divide on whether provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act that create Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violate the Appointments
Clause).
Justice Scalia described this theory in detail in Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). Four Justices appeared to adopt the theory in the plurality opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable
in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed . . . .’”).
See RICHARD PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.4–2.5 (4th ed. 2002); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government,
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23, 25 (1988) (noting that “officers whose responsibilities include
both policymaking and some significant role in adjudicatory proceedings can be the subject of ‘for cause’ limits on the President’s removal power, but ‘cause’ must include failure to comply with any valid policy decision made by the President or his agent”).
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 14.
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the President has is to remove the executive branch officer and replace him or her with someone who will act in accordance with the
President’s views of wise policy.
Peter Strauss has argued persuasively that the President has the
power to remove subordinates but not the power to veto the decisions
11
of subordinates. Calabresi and Yoo say nothing that persuades me
that they are right and Strauss is wrong on this point. In fact, they say
little about the issue beyond their conclusory statement that the President has the power to veto or nullify decisions made by executive
branch officers. They also provide little evidence that any President
has asserted such a power or attempted to exercise such a power.
On a recent occasion, I personally observed a representative of
the President acknowledge the accuracy of Strauss’s position. The
12
occasion was a panel discussion of Executive Order 13,422 during
the spring 2008 meeting of the American Bar Association Section of
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. During the discussion, a
critic of the Order argued that the President was overreaching. The
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”)—in the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)—
responded by saying that he could not understand what all the fuss
was about as it was clear that the only mechanism the president can
13
use to obtain compliance from any agency is the power of removal.
The difference between the power to veto and the power to remove is not subtle. If a President could veto a decision of an executive branch officer, he undoubtedly would do so with some frequency
and often at little political cost. By contrast, removing an officer is
always costly. Frequently, the cost of removal is so high that a President reluctantly acquiesces in a decision with which he strongly disagrees in order to avoid incurring the high cost of removing the executive branch officer responsible for the decision.
Though
discussed at length in a subsequent part of this Article, an example
here illustrates the potentially high cost of removal. I believe that
President Nixon’s unquestionably lawful decisions to remove Attorney General Elliot Richardson, Acting Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus, and indirectly, Special Counsel Archibald Cox cost him

11
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Peter Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) (“[I]n the ordinary world of domestic administration, where
Congress has delegated responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created,
that delegation is a part of the law whose faithful execution the President is to assure.
Oversight, and not decision, is his responsibility.” (footnote omitted)).
See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
Administrator’s statement has been paraphrased.
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the presidency. By contrast, President Clinton survived a similar
scandal by prudently refraining from removing Attorney General Janet Reno and replacing her with someone who would remove Ken
Starr from the Whitewater investigation. Clinton understood that his
decision would cost him far more than allowing Starr to continue the
Whitewater investigation.
II. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT ALWAYS PREVAILED
Calabresi and Yoo claim that the President has always prevailed in
his many battles with Congress over the removal power:
Big fights about whether the Constitution grants the president the removal power have erupted frequently, but each time the president in
power has claimed that the Constitution gives the president power to remove and direct subordinates in the executive branch. And each time
14
the president has prevailed, and Congress has backed down.

This is a questionable characterization of a complicated body of
case law. Calabresi and Yoo implicitly recognize in other parts of
their book that the President has lost three major battles regarding
15
the removal power. Three times the Court has upheld statutory limits on the President’s removal power; none of those cases has been
16
overruled. The President continues to be subject to statutory limits
on his power to remove many executive branch officers. Moreover,
over the last half century no President has challenged those judiciallyapproved limits on his removal power by attempting to remove any of
the many executive branch officers that are subject to such limits.
In each of the three cases in which the President did not prevail,
the Court held that the President could remove the executive branch
officer only for cause. For reasons that I will discuss in detail in a subsequent part of this Article, I do not consider the for-cause limit on
the President’s power to remove some executive branch officers im-
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CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4.
See id. at 9 (proposing that Presidents should continue to “challenge unconstitutional limits on the removal power . . . notwithstanding judicial decisions we discuss below, like
Morrison v. Olson and Humphrey’s Executor, that are inconsistent with the unitary executive”
(footnotes omitted)).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (holding that the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by restricting the Attorney General’s power to remove independent counsel to instances of “good cause”);
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (rejecting president’s removal of a War
Claims Commission member solely in the interest of replacing him with his personal selection); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–32 (1935) (holding
that a President’s ability to remove heads of agencies, which are not purely executive in
nature, is constitutionally limited).
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portant. Unlike Calabresi and Yoo, I do not believe that limit has any
real effect on the President’s ability to control policy making in the
executive branch.
If we set aside the three cases in which the Supreme Court held
that Congress can impose a for-cause limit on the President’s power
to remove some executive branch officers, Calabresi and Yoo’s claim
is accurate. The Court has never upheld a statute that precludes the
President, or an agent of the President, from removing an executive
branch officer for cause, and the Court has repeatedly held unconstitutional statutes that give Congress any role in the process of remov17
ing an executive branch officer. Calabresi and Yoo argue that any
for-cause limit on the President’s removal power is unconstitutional
18
and is inconsistent with the unitary executive theory. I do not consider for-cause limits unconstitutional or inconsistent with the unitary
executive theory. Thus, ironically, while Calabresi and Yoo’s claim
that Presidents have prevailed in each case in which they have fought
with Congress about the removal power is inaccurate, given their version of the unitary executive theory, it is accurate in the context of my
version of the theory.

17

18

See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (holding that Congress retained control over the removal power, unconstitutionally intruding on the executive function);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161, 163–64 (1926) (holding that removal of executive officials and inferior officers is an executive function, upon which Congress may not
infringe).
See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4 (“Under this practice [of construing the Constitution as vesting the removal power in a unitary executive], congressional efforts to insulate
executive branch subordinates from presidential control by creating independent agencies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional.”).
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III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY DOES NOT ENSURE THAT
AGENCIES ACT IN A CONSISTENT MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PRESIDENT’S POLICY PREFERENCES
Unlike Calabresi and Yoo, I believe that for-cause limits on the
President’s power to remove some executive branch officers are constitutional and are consistent with the unitary executive theory. Furthermore, Calabresi and Yoo make a powerful and sweeping normative, instrumental claim about the effects of the unitary executive
theory: “The Constitution’s creation of a unitary executive eliminates
conflicts in law enforcement and regulatory policy by ensuring that
all of the cabinet departments and agencies that make up the federal
government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in ac19
cordance with the president’s wishes.” That statement is theoretically true, but we now know that this is one of the areas in which
there is a large gap between theory and reality.
Like most legal academics, Calabresi and Yoo assume that the
President exercises control over the bureaucracy primarily through
the systematic, relatively transparent processes described in Executive
Orders 12,291, 12,866, and 13,422. Those Executive Orders authorize the OIRA to take a variety of actions to implement the President’s
preferred policies. If that process was the primary means through
which the President exercised control over the bureaucracy, Calabresi and Yoo’s description of the effects of presidential control might be
a reasonably good first approximation of reality. If the President exercised control primarily through OIRA, it would be safe to assume
that policy directives from the White House to agencies would be
consistent and would reflect the policy preferences of the President.
The transparent systematic control mechanisms used by OIRA to control the bureaucracy, however, are not now, and never have been, the
most important means through which Presidents, and presidential
subordinates who purport to be acting on behalf of the President, exercise control over the bureaucracy. Largely invisible ad hoc White
House jawboning is now, and always has been, far more important in
its impact on agency policy decisions.
If any doubt existed about the relative importance of ad hoc jawboning by the White House, two studies published in the last year
should end any debate about the subject. Lisa Bressman and Michael
Vandenbergh conducted an empirical study of all contacts between
the White House and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

19

CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 3.
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during the administrations of President George H. W. Bush and Pres20
ident Bill Clinton. They found that eighteen White House offices—
in addition to OIRA—attempted to control policy making at EPA
21
during that period. They also found that the various White House
22
offices often tried to persuade EPA to adopt different policies.
Moreover, while OIRA was the most frequent source of White House
influence and had the greatest effect on relatively routine policy decisions, other White House offices had more influence over the most
23
important policy decisions made by the EPA.
Jo Becker and Barton Gellman, two investigative reporters for the
Washington Post, conducted the second study that provides a window
24
on White House control of agency policy decisions. They found that
Vice President Dick Cheney exercised extraordinary power over
agency policy making by using a clever, extremely low visibility proc25
ess. Vice President Cheney first persuaded President Bush to appoint over two dozen people who were personally loyal to Vice President Cheney to policy-making positions in many agencies. He then
exercised control over many agency policy decisions by calling one of
his people at an agency and persuading him or her to make a deci26
sion that reflected his policy preferences. Thus, for instance, the
Department of the Interior reversed a prior decision concerning the
balance between farming and fisheries’ interests in the operation of
dams as a result of Vice President Cheney’s communications with the
Department’s nineteenth ranking official. Most of Cheney’s highly
successful efforts to control agency policy decisions were unknown to
the head of the agency involved, much less to President Bush. We
will never know the extent to which Cheney’s highly effective means
of exercising control over many agency policy decisions produced
policies preferred by President Bush.
The findings of these two studies should not come as any great
surprise to anyone familiar with the White House, the bureaucracy,

20
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Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 68 (2006) (describing OIRA
and other executive office involvement in and jockeying for influence in the EPA rulemaking).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A1 (describing a number of cases in which the Vice President personally intervened to ensure
that federal government policies aligned with the administration’s political philosophy).
Id.
Id.
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and the relationship between the two. The dramatic increase in the
size and scope of the sprawling bureaucracy that occurred over the
past century was followed by an analogous increase in the size and
scope of the now sprawling White House bureaucracy. Over the same
period, the number of political employees within the bureaucracy also has increased dramatically—tenfold between 1960 and 2000 and
27
fourfold between 1990 and 2000. The net result is a massive White
House bureaucracy that influences agency policy making through
communications among thousands of political appointees.
It is simply impossible for the President to control the White
House, much less the bureaucracy. There are not enough hours in
the day for the President to be aware of more than a tiny fraction of
the policy decisions made by agencies every day. Moreover, the chain
of agency relationships between the President and the people who actually make policy decisions in the bureaucracy is far too long to indulge the assumption that everyone in the White House who purports to speak for the President is acting consistently with the
President’s policy preferences.
Despite the yawning gap between Calabresi and Yoo’s normative
instrumental claims for the unitary executive theory and reality, I
share their belief that presidential control over agency policy making
is highly desirable. It increases to some uncertain extent the degree
of coordination and consistency in the bureaucracy and the degree of
convergence between the policies adopted by agencies and the policies preferred by the President. As in all other contexts, it is important not to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good.
IV. FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE
OFFICERS ARE NOT IMPORTANT
Calabresi and Yoo repeatedly emphasize their strong belief that
the President has, and must have, an unqualified power to remove an
28
executive branch subordinate. I agree that the President must have
the power to remove any executive branch officer and that Congress
cannot be allowed to give itself any role in the removal process. I am
pleased that the Supreme Court has acted in a manner consistent
with that view. I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo, however, to the ex-

27
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PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 164 (2007) (noting
that “President Kennedy had 286 political leadership positions to fill, President Clinton
914, and President George W. Bush 3,361”).
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4–7.
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tent that they argue that Congress cannot impose a for-cause limit on
the President’s power to remove some executive branch officers and
to the extent that they argue that the President can remove without
cause executive branch employees who have no policy making responsibility. I believe that the President can control policy making
within the executive branch even though he does not have plenary
power to remove every executive branch subordinate.
In three cases, the Court has held that Congress can limit the
President’s power to remove an executive branch officer by requiring
the President to state a cause for removal if Congress identifies an
adequate functional rationale to support such a limitation, e.g., the
29
agency adjudicates disputes involving private rights, the agency pro30
vides advice to Congress, or the agency has responsibility to investigate and/or prosecute alleged criminal wrongdoing at a high level in
31
the executive branch. I do not believe that the for-cause limits the
Court upheld in those cases are inconsistent with the unitary executive theory or preclude the President from controlling policy making
within the executive branch. In fact, I think they have little, if any,
effect on the President’s ability to control executive branch policy
making.
The vast majority of executive branch officers have three reasons
to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences independent of the President’s removal power. All were either appointed
or nominated by the President because of some combination of three
characteristics—agreement with the President on policy issues related
to their areas of responsibility, long-time loyalty to the President’s political party, and/or personal loyalty to the President. As a result,
Presidents rarely need to resort to explicit or implicit threats to remove an officer to persuade the officer to act in accordance with the
President’s policy preferences. On the unusual occasion when an officer feels so strongly about a policy issue that the President is unable
to persuade the officer to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences, I do not believe that the legal requirement that the
President state a cause for removing the officer has any effect on the
29
30

31

Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (discussing the President’s ability to remove
members of the War Claims Commission).
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (discussing the President’s
abilty to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission). At the time the Court decided Humphrey’s Executor, Congress had no independent means of conducting an investigation to determine whether there was a need to enact a new regulatory statute, so it was
entirely dependent on the Federal Trade Commission to perform that function.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing the President’s ability to remove independent counsel in the Attorney General’s investigations).
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President’s ability to use the threat of removal as an added means of
inducing the officer to act in accordance with the President’s policy
preferences.
We know little about the contours of the for-cause limit on the
President’s removal power. Thus, for instance, we do not know
whether a court would be willing to review a President’s decision to
remove an officer if the President stated that he removed the officer
for cause, and we do not know whether an officer’s refusal to act in
accordance with the President’s policy preferences qualifies as a sufficient cause for removal. I doubt that a court would be willing to review a President’s decision to remove an officer for cause, but if it did
review such a decision, I am confident that a court would conclude
that refusal to comply with a President’s stated policies qualifies as
sufficient cause for removal. While I cannot prove that my beliefs are
correct, no one can prove that they are incorrect. Without knowing
the answers to those critical questions, it is impossible to conclude
that a for-cause limit on the removal power has any effect at all on the
President’s ability to use an express or implied threat of removal as
an added inducement in an effort to persuade an officer to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences.
We know so little about the for-cause limit on the removal power
because there has never been any case in the 220 year history of the
country in which a President has removed an officer for cause and
the officer has refused to leave his position. That gives rise to an important question. Why have there been no cases of this type? One
possibility is that no President has ever encountered a situation in
which he so disagreed with an officer who was subject to a for-cause
limit that he wanted to remove the officer. That seems highly unlikely, given the thousands of people who have served in such positions.
Another possibility is that every President reluctantly has concluded
that he could not remove any officer who holds such a position no
matter how strongly the President disagreed with the officer. That
seems equally unlikely, given the number and variety of occasions on
which Presidents and officers subject to for-cause limitations on their
removal must have disagreed on important issues of policy.
A third potential explanation exists that I find far more plausible—some uncertain percentage of the thousands of “voluntary resignations” of such officers were not as voluntary as they appeared to
outside observers. Imagine that you are an executive branch officer
who reaches an impasse with your President with respect to some important policy issue. The President asks you to resign. You know that
the President has the power to remove you. You may or may not
know whether you are subject to a for-cause limit on your removal. I
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doubt that many executive branch officers even know whether they
are subject to such a limit. Would you hire a lawyer to determine
your rights and to fight to retain your job? That would put you at
odds with the person who appointed you, who is almost always someone you respect and admire as well as the head of your political party.
It also would expose you to the risk of extreme embarrassment if the
President then specifies a cause to remove you, as well as the risk of
incurring the wrath of many of your old friends and fellow party
members for taking an action that many would consider an act of extreme disloyalty. You would pay an extremely high cost for doing that
which no one in your position has ever chosen to do—launch a legal
fight to retain your job.
Now consider the alternative. You can agree to resign and to be
honored by the President in a Rose Garden ceremony at which the
President lavishes praise on you and regrets your decision to resign to
spend more time with your family. You then can accept one of the
many job offers that pay five to ten times your current salary and
leave the administration with an impeccable reputation both with the
public and in your political party.
It is hard to imagine any officer who would give more than a moment’s thought to the high cost option of litigating to try to retain his
job with such an attractive alternative. Thus, I am quite confident
that that is why there has never been a case in which a President has
specified a cause to remove an officer and the officer has relied on a
for-cause limit on the President’s removal power as the basis to challenge the legality of the President’s decision. The absence of any
case of that type in over two centuries persuades me that the presence
or absence of a for-cause limit on the President’s power to remove an
executive officer is of little, if any, consequence to the President’s
ability to maintain control over policy making in the executive
branch.
V. FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE
EMPLOYEES ARE NOT IMPORTANT
Calabresi and Yoo also argue that the unitary executive theory requires the President to have an unlimited power to remove executive
32
branch employees, as well as officers. They argue that the statutory
limits on removal of civil servants actually do not limit the President’s
power to remove employees because they have been, and should be,

32

CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 422–23.
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interpreted only to prohibit the President from removing an em33
ployee because he refuses to contribute to political campaigns.
They do not support this claim with the abundant high quality evidence on which they rely to support most of their other claims, and
this claim is contradicted by both precedents and long-standing practice.
The law is particularly clear with respect to the statutory limits on
the President’s power to remove an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
34
As I have described at length elsewhere, the statutory for-cause limit
on the President’s power to remove an ALJ has existed since 1946; it
has been consistently interpreted to have a meaning far broader than
Calabresi and Yoo claim and so broad that it is at least as difficult to
remove an ALJ as it is to impeach an Article III judge; and, no President has ever tested that broad limit on his removal power by attempting to remove an ALJ without specifying a cause.
Unlike statutory limits on the President’s power to remove officers, statutory limits on the President’s power to remove employees
have real effects on the conduct of Presidents and employees. Employees are in dramatically different circumstances from officers, and
each of the many differences between the two groups increases significantly the likelihood that an employee will obtain counsel and litigate in response to an attempt to remove him. Unlike most officers,
most employees were not appointed by the President, have no personal loyalty to the President, have no loyalty to the President’s party,
are unlikely to suffer social or professional harm as a result of challenging a removal decision, and are unlikely to have financially attractive alternatives to their government jobs. Thus, while only a
handful of officers have ever challenged a presidential removal decision, employees often challenge decisions to remove them.
I believe that the broad statutory limits on the President’s power
to remove employees are consistent with the unitary executive theory
and do not interfere with the President’s ability to control policy
making in the executive branch for one simple reason. Employees
do not have the power to make policy decisions. That is the primary
35
distinction between employees and officers.
33
34

35

Id. at 422.
See PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 124–65 (1992); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from
Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 504–15 (1990).
Pierce, supra note 9, at 20–40. In Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the
court held that ALJs are employees rather than officers. I sometimes include a question
on my final exam in Administrative Law in which I ask students to evaluate the legality of
one of the many legislative proposals to give ALJs greater power to make final policy deci-
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VI. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO USE OF THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL
POWER ARE FORMIDABLE
While legal obstacles to the use of the President’s removal power
are insignificant in their effects, political obstacles are often formidable. Calabresi and Yoo appear to agree with me on this point. They
refer to many situations in which Presidents have faced major political obstacles to removal and to others in which Presidents erred by
exercising the removal power in circumstances in which the cost of
exercising the power was far too high. The famous incidents to
which they refer include President Nixon’s fatal decision to remove
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, Acting Attorney General William
Ruckelshaus, and special counsel Archibald Cox when Cox seemed to
be on the verge of uncovering President Nixon’s role in the Watergate scandal, and President George W. Bush’s decision to remove
seven U.S. Attorneys—a decision that Calabresi and Yoo characterize
as one through which the Bush administration “badly wounded itself”
36
and from which “it will never fully recover.” In each case, there was
no legal obstacle to the exercise of the removal power; yet, the political costs of exercising the removal power were so high that they
posed a threat to the viability and/or continued efficacy of the presidential administration.
Calabresi and Yoo also identify one of the variables that can cause
the political cost of removing an executive branch officer to be par37
ticularly high —whether the opposition party controls the Senate.
They argue that President Clinton would have removed Janet Reno as
Attorney General if Democrats had controlled the Senate at the time.
Even though President Clinton disliked Reno and wanted to remove
her, Calabresi and Yoo express their belief that he declined to do so
out of concern that the ensuing hearings on potential confirmation
of her successor would have been too embarrassing and politically
costly. That explanation is plausible as at least one factor that influenced President Clinton’s decision, and the identity of the party that
controls the Senate undoubtedly is one of the variables that determines the magnitude of the political cost of removing an officer.
We have seen a more recent example of the importance of this variable in the obvious reluctance of President George W. Bush to re-

36
37

sions that bind agencies. The good students apply the case law under the Appointments
Clause and conclude that all such proposals would be unconstitutional because they
would convert ALJs into officers by conferring on them power to make policy decisions.
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 414.
Id. at 8.
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move Attorney General Gonzales. President Bush eventually removed Gonzales but long after his incompetence and tendency toward prevarication had made him a major liability to the administration. The delay in removing Gonzales undoubtedly was motivated in
part by the difficulty the administration encountered in finding a potential replacement who would testify at his confirmation hearing in a
way that would allow him to be confirmed but that would not implicate President Bush in felonious conduct. If the nominated replacement for Attorney General Gonzales testified that water boarding is
not torture, he would not be confirmed. If he testified that waterboarding is torture, he implicitly would be accusing President Bush of
violating several statutes, including statutes that make it a crime to
engage in torture. Unsurprisingly, the administration had difficulty
finding someone who would profess to have views on the meaning of
torture that were so contingent and non-committal that he could be
confirmed without implicating the President in criminal wrongdoing.
Other variables also affect the magnitude of the political costs of
removing an officer. For instance, President Bush’s desire to avoid
shining a spotlight on unpopular administration practices, like torture and widespread violations of individual rights, motivated, in part,
his delayed removal of Attorney General Gonzales. Even if Republicans had controlled the Senate, confirmation hearings for a new Attorney General would have drawn attention to these publicly and politically unpopular practices.
Similarly, President Clinton’s desire to avoid political backlash
and public scrutiny, in addition to a Republican-controlled Senate,
tempered his desire to remove Attorney General Reno. President
Clinton wanted to remove Reno for several reasons, including for the
level of her cooperation with Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr,
during his investigation of alleged presidential wrongdoing. President Clinton would have much preferred that the Starr investigation
end. It is thus ironic that the ongoing and constantly expanding nature of the Starr investigation undoubtedly was among the reasons
President Clinton concluded that the cost of removing Reno would
be too high.
The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
Act required an Independent Counsel to “comply with
38
the . . . policies of the Department of Justice.” The statute also authorized the Attorney General to remove an independent counsel for

38

Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039, 2041
(1983).
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cause. It would have been child’s play for any Attorney General to
identify some respect in which Independent Counsel Starr’s wideranging investigation violated one of the Department of Justice’s
thousands of policies. President Clinton easily could have named
someone to be Acting Attorney General who would have removed
Starr for allegedly violating a Department of Justice policy. Thus, he
could have followed President Nixon’s lead and removed Attorney
General Reno, and each of her replacements in the line of succession
at the Department, until he found someone willing to remove Independent Counsel Starr for cause. I doubt that any court would find a
legal flaw in that sequence of actions. Furthermore, President Clinton would have been delighted at two of the results—removal of Attorney General Reno and removal of Independent Counsel Starr.
Yet, President Clinton understood that the cost of removing anyone who had a major role in investigating his conduct would have
been intolerably high. He did not want to meet the same fate as President Nixon. He concluded that he would be better off leaving Reno
and Starr in office and fighting a public relations war against Starr.
History has demonstrated that President Nixon underestimated the
cost of removing officers with roles in investigating the President,
while President Clinton evidenced a good understanding of the cost
of such a removal decision.
Many other incidents illustrate the often high political cost of removing an officer. On at least three occasions, President Reagan and
Secretary of State Shultz had highly visible disagreements about ma39
jor issues. Secretary Shultz prevailed on each one. For instance,
when President Reagan ordered polygraph tests to be administered
to 4,500 personnel at the State Department in an effort to discover
the source of an embarrassing leak, Secretary Shultz called a press
conference at which he angrily announced that no one at the State
40
Department would submit to a polygraph. President Reagan had
every legal right to remove Secretary Shultz without specifying any
cause, but instead, he backed down.
President Reagan’s decision stemmed from his belief that he
would pay an intolerably high cost if he were to remove Secretary
Shultz. The total political cost of removing Schultz would be the sum
of three components: the cost in the form of loss of the services of an
officer whose services the President valued highly; the cost in the
form of reduced respect for the President in the foreign relations

39
40

Terry Atlas, Shultz Offered 3 Times to Resign, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1987, at 4.
Shultz Took Vigorous Stand On Lie Tests, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1987, at 4.
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community because of the community’s high regard for the Secretary; and the cost in the form of reduced public popularity of the
President, because many members of the public were likely to side
with the Secretary on the issue of whether mass polygraphing of
thousands of people was an appropriate response to a leak.
Each of those costs is generalizable to the other cases in which
Presidents have to consider the many ways in which a decision to remove an officer might impose high costs on him. In all such cases, a
President must consider carefully the value of the services of the officer, the popularity of the officer in some important community, the
risk that the public might side with the officer with respect to the issue on which the two differ, the potential problems the President
might encounter in attempting to persuade the Senate to confirm a
replacement for the officer, the risk that the ensuing confirmation
hearings will be embarrassing to the President, and the risk that the
public might draw the inference that the removal decision is part of
an effort to cover up, or block investigation of, wrongdoing by the
President or senior members of his administration.
Of course, each case is unique. President George W. Bush incurred only modest political costs after he removed Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) Director Michael Brown, following FEMA’s utterly incompetent response to the Hurricane
Katrina disaster; Director Brown has publicly criticized President
Bush on many occasions since his removal from office. The political
costs of not removing Director Brown, however, far outweighed the
costs of removing him.
It is highly unlikely that any President ever gives serious thought
to the presence or absence of a for-cause limit on his removal power
in making a decision to remove an officer. That legal technicality is
inconsequential in the high-stakes world of Presidential politics. The
strength of the political limits on the President’s removal power depends on many variables, but those costs are completely independent
of any legal limits. The political limits on the President’s removal
power are indispensable to the proper functioning of a democracy.
They provide a means through which the public can hold the president politically accountable for his actions.

VII. FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ARE UNRELATED TO THE “INDEPENDENT
AGENCY” PROBLEM
Calabresi and Yoo refer to so-called “independent agencies” as an
illustration of the problems that can be created by for-cause limits on
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the President’s removal power.
Like most legal academics, they
equate the concept of an independent agency with statutory for-cause
limits on the President’s power to remove an agency head. Calabresi
and Yoo characterize as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the
unitary executive theory the Supreme Court’s famous decision in
42
Humphrey’s Executor, in which the Court upheld the statutory forcause limit on the President’s power to remove an FTC Commis43
sioner.
To their credit, Calabresi and Yoo acknowledge that no evidence
demonstrates that independent agencies are less responsive to the
policy preferences of the President than are agencies headed by offi44
cers who can be removed without any stated cause. In discussing the
administrations of President Reagan and President Clinton, they
note: “At times it even seemed that presidential appointees in independent agencies were more committed to the administration’s pol45
icy program than were the president’s own cabinet secretaries.” Calabresi and Yoo seem surprised by the absence of evidence that
“independent agencies” are any more “independent” of the President
46
in the policy making context. That dearth of evidence fits well with
my belief that the presence or absence of a for-cause limit on the
President’s removal power has no significant effect on the President’s
ability to persuade executive branch officers, including commissioners of independent agencies, to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences.
Even if we indulge the plausible assumption that independent
agencies are more difficult for Presidents to control than other agencies, the for-cause limit on the President’s removal power is unlikely
to be a significant factor in explaining the difference between independent agencies and agencies that are headed by officers who are
subject to an unlimited removal power. Independent agencies differ
from other agencies in other respects that better explain any difference in the President’s ability to persuade them to act in accordance
with the President’s policy preferences. Independent agencies are
headed by multi-member collegial bodies. Each member, usually
called a Commissioner, is appointed for a term of years, with the
terms staggered so that only one Commissioner’s term expires every

41
42
43
44
45
46

See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 6.
See id. at 9.
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 6–8.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 6–8.
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year. The statutes that establish independent agencies limit the President’s appointment power by providing that no more than a bare
majority of the Commissioners can be members of the same political
party.
As a practical matter, the statutory limit on the President’s appointment power requires the President to appoint two Commissioners who are members of the opposing party. Moreover, if the Senate
is controlled by the opposing party, the President often has no practical choice but to appoint a commissioner who has been chosen by
the leaders of the opposing party as the price of persuading the Senate to confirm a Commissioner who has been chosen by the President. It is certainly plausible that independent agencies headed by
five-member collegial bodies, two of whom are likely to be political
opponents of the President, are less likely to act in accordance with
the President’s policy preferences than are agencies headed by individuals who have been chosen by the President. Thus, to the extent
that independent agencies interfere with the unitary executive theory
by impairing the President’s ability to direct executive branch officers
and agencies to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences, the source of that problem lies not in the innocuous for-cause
restriction on the President’s removal power but in the highly restrictive statutory limits on the President’s appointment power.
I am confident that the statutory limits on the appointment power
contained in all of the statutes that create independent agencies are
unconstitutional. So far, however, no one has been able to persuade
a court to address that important question. The D.C. Circuit has held
that such limits are not justiciable except in the unlikely event that a
President nominates and the Senate confirms more than a majority
47
of members of such an agency who are members of the same party.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, I share Calabresi and Yoo’s belief in the importance of the
unitary executive theory, the President’s power to remove executive
branch officers, and the President’s ability to direct executive branch
officers and agencies to act in accordance with the President’s policy
preferences. I congratulate them on writing an excellent book that
makes two important contributions to the literature on the unitary
executive theory. First, they engage in a successful attempt to save
the unitary executive theory from the bad odor that surrounds it to-
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day as a result of the Bush administration’s outlandish claims of presidential power—claims that have no relation to the unitary executive
theory. Second, they demonstrate through careful historical research
that every President in history has acted in a manner that is consistent
with his belief in the unitary executive.
I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo on only three major points.
First, I do not believe that the President has the power to veto a decision made by an executive officer to whom Congress has delegated
the decision. If the President disagrees with such a decision his only
recourse is to remove the officer.
Second, I do not believe that the statutory for-cause limits on the
President’s power to remove employees and some officers unconstitutionally impair the President’s power to control policy making in the
executive branch. The for-cause limits on the President’s power to
remove some officers do not have any adverse effect on the President’s ability to use the implicit or explicit threat of removal as one of
the many means through which he can persuade an executive officer
to act in accordance with his policy preferences. The only legal limits
on the President’s power to remove officers that the Court has upheld are innocuous in their effects on the President’s ability to control policy making in the executive branch. The political obstacles to
removal of an officer are often formidable, but they are both unrelated to any legal limits on the President’s removal power, and socially beneficial through their effects on presidential accountability to
the electorate.
The legal limits on the President’s power to remove executive
branch employees that the courts have consistently upheld have no
adverse effects on the President’s power to control policy making in
the executive branch for a different reason—by definition, employees
have no power to make policy decisions.
Finally, I believe that any unconstitutional impairment of the President’s power to control policy making by “independent agencies” is
attributable to statutory limits on the President’s appointment powers
rather than to statutory limits on his removal power.

